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  Following the present atmosphere of budgetary cuts in the OECD countries we 
analyze the effects of fiscal consolidation in the composition of government expenditures 
by functions. We modify a standard median voter demand model to incorporate a form of 
fiscal illusion based on the idea that voters-taxpayers may not be fully aware of the true 
composition of government expenditures because all types of expenditures are not equally 
visible. Then we exploit the panel structure of the dataset – 26 OECD countries over the 
period 1970-1997- by GMM estimation of a dynamic model taking into account 
unobserved country effects and possible endogeinity of the explanatory variables. Under 
the assumption that governments know the relative visibility of each type of expenditure, 
the pattern of the last three decades indicates that defense and the non-productive 
economic services are the less visible expenditures. On the other hand, education and 
housing seem to be the more visible expenditures.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
  As OECD member countries have recently begun to reduce their budgets, 
governments will be forced to make spending decisions. Fiscal discipline will require 
cuts in government expenditure leading to trade-off between different functions and 
affecting government expenditure composition. Through its impact on the composition of 
public expenditures, fiscal consolidation can also affect economic growth. Some 
endogenous growth models incorporate the composition of government spending, among 
other fiscal variables, which are capable of yielding steady state effects (Devarajan et al., 
1996, Kneller et al, 1999). Moreover Davoodi and Zou (1998) show that there is an 
optimal composition of government expenditures in which the optimal shares of each 
component equal its growth elasticity relative to all the function's growth elasticities. 
Therefore, the reduction of government expenditures can modify the composition of 
government expenditures approaching or deviating from its optimal structure.       
 
Now, in this article we explore how functions of the government expenditures has 
been affected by government size. The pattern of the manner government expenditures 
size, either in expansions or contractions, have affected its allocation could shed some 
light on how fiscal discipline might influence public spending composition in the future. 
For this purpose, we will modify a standard median voter model incorporating a type of 
fiscal illusion based on the idea that voters may not be aware of the true composition of 
government expenditures because all types of expenditures are not equally visible.  
   
  In order to investigate all these aspects, in section 2 we review the existing 





expenditures. In section 3, we go on to modify the standard median voter model including 
a form of fiscal illusion that allows us to analyze how governments may deviate the 
composition of government expenditure from that demanded by the median voter. 
However, varying government size may be a process requiring a slow adjustment in the 
public expenditure allocation. Thus, in section 4, we analyze the determinants of 
government expenditure composition in a dynamic model framework. For this purpose we 
will use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) which, besides specific country effects, also takes account of endogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variable and of other explanatory variables. Finally, in section 5, we 
draw the most significant conclusions. 
 
2. Fiscal consolidation and the composition of government expenditures by functions 
 
  The composition of the adjustment matters in determining the success of a 
stabilization plan. Zaghini (2001) and Ardagna (2001) show that fiscal consolidations 
that concentrate on the expenditure side are more effective at achieving household's 
welfare increases and long-lasting reduction of public liabilities than tax-based 
adjustments. Indeed, Zaghini (2001) shows that policymakers have recently shifted their 
priorities from a past policy of deficit financing to one of expenditure reduction policy. 
Furthermore, Alesina and Perotti (1995) show that adjustments among expenditures are 
also relevant: those based on social transfers and the wage component of public 
consumption are more persistent than the ones based on investments reduction and 
earned income tax increases. However, some articles argue that fiscal adjustments take 
place  reducing  investments  because,  as   pointed  out  by Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
and Oxley and Martin  (1991),  political  reasons  make  it  easier  to  diminish this type 





(1996) and Sturm (1998) for the OECD member states show that fiscal adjustment 
affects investments particularly.  
 
  Nevertheless, effects of fiscal consolidation on the structure of government 
expenditures by functions have received limited attention unlike its impact on the 
distribution of expenditures by economic type. Only some articles have analyzed the 
effect of the reduction of government expenditures in individual functions. Thus, Cashin et 
al. (2001) and Baqir (2002) show for a sample of developing and developed countries 
during 1985-1998 that when governments are faced with the need to cut overall 
expenditures,  education and health are relatively more protected. Hicks and Kubisch 
(1984) also find that social spending may be more resilient to cuts in real government 
expenditures than defence, and that productive and infrastructure expenditures are the most 
vulnerable. In fact, Looney (1997) suggests that military expenditure face hard budgetary 
constraints.  
 
  On the other hand, Ravallion (2002) finds that fiscal consolidation in Argentina in 
the decade of the 80's and the 90's led to more than proportionate cuts in education, health 
and social security spending. Along these lines, Jonakin and Stephens (1999) reveal that 
countries of Central America have changed their composition of government expenditures 
after entering into formal agreements of adjustments and stabilization policies with 
international organizations. In particular these countries have reduced the shares devoted to 
human and physical infrastructure while at the same time increased the shares allocated to 





3. Theoretical model 
 
The base model under which the fiscal consolidation and other demographic 
determinants of public spending by functions are considered is the median voter model, 
developed from the studies of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom a nd 
Goodman (1973). We will also incorporate demographic factors affecting the utility 
function of the median voter. To be specific, we assume that the age structure of the 
population and population density of the country in which the median voter lives 
reflects to some extent characteristics of the median voter. Therefore, we assume that 
the median voter maximises a utility function which not only depends on public good and 
services (Gi) and consumption of a composite private good (Xi) but also on the age and 
distance to the public services of the median voter reflected by demographic factors of the 
country in which he lives (Zi), subject to a budget constraint such:    
 
  The inclusion of demographic factors in the utility function of the median voter 
still makes that the problem has the form of an ordinary two-good consumer problem 
 where the price for Gi is Pgi and Yi is the median income
1. The demand for Gi will be of 
the form: 
where: 
N1, N2, N3: population in the median voter's country in the age interval of 0-15 years, 16-
                         
1 Note that the standard median voter model includes also per capita central government grants to median 
voter's municipality in the right hand side of the budget constraint equation (1). However, as this model will 
be used for explaining consolidated government expenditures, including all levels of administration spending, 
transfers between all levels of administration offset each other. Nevertheless, results should be taken with 
some caution since the median voter model perform less adequately in explaining public spending for higher 
levels of administration than for lowest level governments (Turnbull and Mitias, 1999).  
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64 years and over 64, respectively. 
L: land area of the country where the median voter lives. 
  If we suppose constant elasticities, then we could express the demand as: 
where: 
a, b, fj and fl: income, price, age and land area elasticities. 
  We assume non-discrimination in taxation, as Bocherding and Deacon (1972) and 
enable the public/private sector price ratio to be modified in the course of time (Gemmell 
et al., 1999). Considering that Gi=G N
-h, where N is total population and h the degree of 
congestion of public goods and services, the demand function for the total government 
expenditure is:  
where: 
Pr:reflects the relative prices between the public and private sector. 
h h b f + - + = ) 1 )( 1 (  
  To apply the median voter model to the composition of government expenditures it 
will be useful to assume that the demand for each of the functions of government 
expenditures is also decided in a median voter model framework. In fact, the median voter 
may have different demand functions for each of the types of spending, according to its 
income, price perception and demographic factors. Voters choose by majority rule the 
allocation of government expenditures between these different functions. That means that 
total government size is decided simultaneously, since it is the sum of each of the 
functions. In this set up, median tastes dominate if the number of voters is large relative to 
the number of issues and the preference peaks of the citizenry are normally distributed 
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over the issue space (Tullock, 1967). In addition, Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994) show 
that median voter demand model performs stronger when issues are multi-dimensional 
than in single-dimensional settings: 
and 
where: 
Gf: quantity of public goods and services devoted to function f demanded by the median 
voter-taxpayer i. 
Cf: cost of a unit of public goods and services of function f.  
Pf,r: public prices for the function f relative to private prices.  
f : functions; 
af,bf,f f, fj,f ,and fl,f: income, price, population, age structure and land area elasticities of 
function f. 
hf: degree of congestion of public goods and services allocated to function f. 
  We also consider that voter-taxpayers may not be aware of the true government 
expenditure because public spending is not totally visible. Further all types of spending 
are not equally visible. Hence, the perceived composition of government expenditure 
(G ˆ f) is a function of the actual composition (Gf) and a perception parameter (wf): 
 
  Where wf measures the degree visibility of function f. A negative value of wf will 
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indicate that the perceived expenditure in function f is lower than the true expenditure. For 
these functions where the median voter perceives the true total government expenditures of 
this function wf will take a value 0, i.e. is totally visible. The percentage of the expenditure 
in function f perceived by the median voter G ˆ f/Gf, is decreasing in this type of public 
expenditure Gf. This misperception on the true expenditure on some functions will also 
lead to a mismatch between total government expenditures perceived by the median voter 
G ˆ  and true total public spending G, as long as total perception parameter w is negative: 
 
  We do not know which characteristics may be lagging behind the visibility of 
function  f. However we hypothesise that governments are fully aware of the different 
visibility of each type of spending as well as the total perception parameter and benefit 
from this asymmetric information. Governments devoting more resources to more visible 
expenditures may be seen as offering more public services than those allocating public 
expenditures to less visible type of spending, even when having the same total 
government expenditure. Moreover, governments facing the need for budgetary cuts 
will reduce the less visible expenditures. For example, Roubini and Sachs (1989) and 
Oxley and Martin (1991), Haan et al. (1996) and Sturm (1998) claim that public 
investment is less visible than public consumption or transfers. Hence, when fiscal 
consolidation take place, this reduces investments because political reasons make it 
easier to diminish this less visible expenditure. Those expenditures related to long-term 
projects or with higher degree of pure public good nature such as defence or transport 
and communications may have lower visibility than social security, education, health or 
general public services. We do not know the total perception parameter but we will 
hypothesise that governments reveal the relative visibility of each type of expenditure 




















when expanding or contracting total government expenditure.  
 
  If we want to focus on the composition of government expenditures rather that in 
absolute terms, from (6) and (7) we get: 
 
  That is, the residual of the variance of government expenditures devoted to a type 
of spending  Gf/G  that can not be explained by the demand of the median voter G ˆ f/G ˆ  is 
expected to give indications of how governments benefit from this asymmetric 
information. This will be a sort of fiscal illusion affecting the structure of expenditures. 
 
  Finally, we assume that public deflator is the same across functions so that Cf=C 
" f and hence Pr,f=Pr " f . Thus Gf will reflect the opportunity cost of not having assigned 
those resources to another function. We also assume that Yi equals the mean income per 
capita in every country Y
2. Taking into account these assumptions and replacing G by G ˆ  
in (4) and Gf by G ˆ f in (5) we get:  
 
  Hence, observed elasticity of each factor is affected by visibility of each type of 
spending
3. I n addition, elasticities in equation (9) are relative to that of the total 
                         
2 Ideally we would specify a cost unit Cf for each type of expenditure and the median income. However, 
these data are not available for every country of the OECD and on yearly basis. 
3 It can be argued that population age structure and land area may not be relevant for some functions, i.e. 
fj,f=0 or fl,f=0  for some f. However, as long as, these variables are relevant for some any other function f, 


































































































government expenditure. A zero value should not be interpreted as that the determinant 
does not affect the demand for the public good, but that it does not do so in a way 
significantly different from the rest of government expenditure.  Functions with low 
visibility will have a positive coefficient associated with total government expenditure (w-
wf) and therefore when total government expenditure decreases (increases), function  f 
contracts (expands) more than demanded by the median voter. For these functions with 
higher visibility, ( w-wf) will be negative indicating that this type of spending will be 
protected either in contractions or expansions of government expenditures. Finally, 
expressing it in logarithmic form, rearranging terms and considering that the sample is 
estimated for a panel structure of 26 OECD countries over the period 1970-1997, we get:  
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where, d1,f=1/(1+wf), d2,f=[(af-a)+(wf-w)]/(1+wf), d3,f=(bf-b)/(1+wf), d4,f=[(qf-q)+(wf-w)+(q
1,f-q)+(q3,f  -q)]/(1+wf),  d5,f=(q1,f  -q1)]/(1+wf),  d6,f=(q3,f  -q3)]/(1+wf),  d7,f=(ql,f  -ql)]/(1+wf), 
d8,f=(wf-w)/(1+wf), k is the country, t is the year, uk is a dummy than takes value 1 for 
country k and 0 otherwise and et,k is the classical disturbance term. Country fixed effects 
are useful to capture preferences and institutional and historical factors specific to each 
                                                                        
then fj„0 or fl„0, and (fj,f-fj)„0 or (fl,f-fl)„0. That is, increased or decreased expenditures needs on other 





country and reflecting preferences of the median voter in the determination of the share 
of each function in total government expenditures. As noted earlier, we would like to 
take into account the different relative prices for each of the functions and the median 
income of each country. The actual expression we are estimating differs from the ideal 
estimation only by the terms [(1+(bf qf )] ln(Cf /C) and qf [(af-a)+(wf-w)] ln(Yi/Y ). Thus 
if Cf were the same for all functions we would not incorporate any bias. Furthermore, the 
bias will be smaller as the ratio (Cf/C) approaches unity. Moreover if the ratio (Cf/C) is 
constant across time the omitted term would only affect to the intercept. Alternatively, 
under the assumption that price-elasticity [(1+(bf qf )] is close to one for all functions we 
will incorporate a small bias in the estimation. On the other hand, if Yi is close to Yi  there 
will be small bias in the estimation, which would be zero if the assumption Yi= Yi were 
true. Further, if this ratio is constant over time, the bias will influence only the intercept. 
In fact, Gemmell et al. (1998) find that using median and mean income gives the same 
outcome in the case of local public spending in England and Wales, both measures are 
equally valid representations of the decisive voter. However, using the mean income 
instead of median income, we deviate from the median voter demand model including ad-
hoc specifications (Mueller, 1989).     
 
  The median voter model is the most widely used in the public choice literature. 
This model reflects political choices of the composition of public expenditures, since 
public expenditure is allocated through a political mechanism. Congleton and Shugart 
(1990) and Congleton and Bennett (1995) show that median voter models are stronger 
in explaining public spending on social security and highway than interest group 
models. This does not mean that interest group, or other institutional or redistributive 





models based on these other factors (Ahmed and Greene, 2001). However, this model is 
compatible with a number of other analyses of the allocation of public spending using 
different frameworks other than the median voter. Thus, our analysis does also permit a 
test of functions for which Wagner's law is particularly applicable, whereas the parameter 
estimation of relative prices may be also interpreted as the extent to which functions are 
exposure to Baumol's conjecture
4. The population, age group and land parameters may 
also reflect economies of scale in the production of these functions. Finally, the visibility 
of each type of expenditure is compatible with two other theoretical model frameworks. 
On the one hand to a separately expenditure component public-choice analysis in which a 
leadership maximises a welfare function depending on private consumption, a expenditure 
function, other public expenditures and state variables subject to constraint of resources 
(Davoodi et al., 1999 and Gupta et al., 2001). On the other, the perception parameter its 
also compatible with models that  adopted a consumer demand framework in which 
government maximizes a utility function and allocation of public consumption 
expenditures depend on prices of public services and total expenditures (see Tridimas, 
2001, for a survey)  
 
4. Econometric analysis 
 
  In order to test the  effects of fiscal consolidation on the composition of 
government expenditures  we will use data from the OECD publication  National 
Accounts. Volume II: Detailed Tables.  This source is chosen inasmuch as it offers 
                         
4 Wagner's law postulates that as per capita income rises in industrializating nations, their public sectors 
will grow in relative importance, (see Peacock and Scott, 2000 for a survey on Wagner's Law). On the 
other hand, Baumol (1967) observed that productivity growth was lower in the public sector than in private 
sector, while wage increases were similar. Hence, the share of government spending in GDP will tend to grow 






information on the consolidated spending of all levels of government and, in addition, it 
follows the accrual criterion. Data from national agencies, OECD and  World Bank 
country reports, Eurostat: General Government Accounts and Statistics and the IMF 
publication: Government Finance Statistics, is used on a supplementary basis so as to 
obtain longer statistical series and supplement the informative shortcomings of the basic 
source
5. In this respect, the functions will be arranged very similar to the Classification 
of Functions of the Government (COFOG): public services, defense, health, education, 
housing, transport and communications, social security and other expenditures.  
 
  The share of each function among total government expenditures is calculated at 
current prices, assuming as already mentioned that the deflators across types of 
expenditure are the same. Relative prices are approximated as in Gemmell et al. (1999) by 
the ratio of the public sector deflator to the GDP deflator. Public sector deflator is the result 
of the weighted mean of government investments deflator, public consumption deflator 
and public transfers, the latter represented by the consumer price index, all obtained from 
the OECD: Economic Outlook and national sources. The per capita income (in Purchasing 
Power Parities of the 1995 dollar and in real terms of that year), population series are 
obtained from the OECD: National Accounts: Volume I . Main Aggregates, while the 
population age structure is taken from the OECD: Labour Force Statistics. Some countries 
did not have data prior to 1975 and have had to be completed using domestic sources. 
 
  Adapting to changed median voter demand may be a process requiring a slow 
adjustment in the public expenditure allocation. In fact, inertia in reformulating the budget 
                                                                        
 
5Although IMF data covers a longer period of time, it is not as a rule consolidated for all the Public 
Administrations and uses the cash criterion. (see Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 and Baqir, 2002, for a discussion 





results in composition of expenditure responding very slowly to changes in the demand. 
Hence, we may analyse the determinants of government expenditure composition in 
dynamic model framework. In specifying a dynamic model we assume that actual 
government expenditure does not match the median voter desired level immediately, but 
by a partial adjustment process. The obstacles in a rapid adjustment may be found in the 
fact that some of the expenditures are commitments, as those related to social security or 
interest payments, and most of the public employees and physical stock are also fixed. 
Along these lines some authors have suggested that particular components of government 
expenditures tend to change reasonably slowly over time (Marlow and Shiers, 1999 in the 
case military expenditures, Gerdtham et al., 1994 for health, Fay, 2000 for transport and 
communications and Heinesen, 2002 for education). The way governments benefit from 
the different visibility of expenditures may be also obstructed because of the above 
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  The speed of adjustment  l is assumed to be constant. We will use the GMM 
estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), based on taking first differences on 
(11), dropping unobservable country d ummies and land area. However, taking first 
differences introduced bias because of the correlation between Dek,t and Dln(Gf,k,t-1/ Gk,t-1). 





ln(Gf,k,t/ Gk,t). We will also take into account endogeneity of income per capita and public 
sector size, taking as instruments for Dln(Y k,t) and Dln(Gk,t/Yk,t) at least two lagged values 
of ln(Y k,t) and ln(Gk,t/Yk,t). Note that after taking first differences we include negative first 
order autocorrelation in the transformed model, which would be second order serial 
correlation if in the original model there was already first order serial correlation. In this 
latter case we would have to use instruments for  Dln(Gf,k,t-1/ G k,t-1),  Dln(Yk,t) and  D
ln(Gk,t/Yk,t) at least three periods lagged values of ln(Gf,k,t-1/Gk,t-1), ln(Y k,t) and ln(Gk,t/Yk,t). 
As Table 1 shows, there is only first order autocorrelation for most of the functions. Only 
in the case of other expenditures can the hypothesis of second order autocorrelation not be 
rejected, and thus we have used as instruments at least three lagged values of ln(Gf,k,t-1/Gk,t-
1),  ln(Y k,t) and  ln(Gk,t/Yk,t) in addition to the exogenous explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, the Sargan test statistic of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the 
validity of the instruments used.  We show the results from the one-step GMM estimates, 
which do not underestimate standard errors and inferences from this estimates have been 
proved to be more reliable than inferences from the two-step GMM estimates (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). 
 
  Results show that cuts in total government expenditure may fall on defence and 
other expenditures if it follows the same pattern as in the period 1970-1997. The share of 
military and other expenditures decreases in response to cuts in overall government 
spending. The former finding is in line with Gupta et al. (2001) for a sample of 120 
developing and developed countries and Hartley and Sandler (1990), who show evidence 





Davoodi et al. (1999)
6 for a sample of 130 developed and developing countries and 
Jonakin and Stephens (1999) for developing countries in Central America find that defence 
expenditures is more protected when fiscal discipline is implemented. The positive 
elasticity of other expenditures (interest payments and other economic services) may be 
suggesting that cuts in government expenditure reduce future interest payments, decreasing 
in turn the need for further fiscal adjustments affecting other functions (Mongelli, 1997). In 
fact, governments have already decreased defence expenditure during the '80s and interest 
payments during the '90s preserving other expenditures (Sanz and Velazquez, 2001). It 
may be inferred that OECD governments may have first cut defence spending and 
subsequently benefit from the reduction in interest payments reducing the share devoted to 
other expenditures. 
   
  On the other hand education shows a negative and significant relationship, 
suggesting that it reacts less than one-to-one to changes in government spending. Therefore 
reductions in public spending are associated with increases in the share of education and 
conversely increases in government expenditure reduce the participation of this function. 
These results corroborate the findings of Cashin et al.(2001) and Baqir (2002). That is, 
education is typically more stable than spending on other functions. In fact, Sanz and 
Velázquez (2001) find this function is more stable and similar in the OECD countries 
during the period 1970-1997. Housing also shows a negative relationship with the public 
sector size. We also find a negative coefficient for health as Cashin et al.(2001) and Baqir 
(2002), though not at a significant level. However, this result may be due to the fact that if 
at the margin health spending are more related to care than cure at a time of fiscal 
adjustment protection of these spending are not justified (Hitiris, 1999).  
                         
6 These authors only find that cuts in the government spending to GDP ratio led to a more than 






  The share of rest of the functions, social security, public services, health and 
transport and communications do not have any significant relationship with government 
size. Therefore these functions may be reduced proportionally if governments decrease 
total public spending in the future.  This is an important result, since transport and 
communications expenditures were the main suspect for being affected by government 
expenditure cuts. In contrast with the studies exploring the effects of fiscal consolidation in 
the composition of government spending by economic type, we do not find evidence of 
investment, at least those related to transport and communications, being the least visible 
expenditure.   
 
  For the rest of factors affecting the composition of government, we find results in 
line with the economic literature. The effect of income changes increases the share of 
functions such as education, social security, health, public services a nd transport and 
communications, though these last two functions only at a 10% significance level. We do 
not find any significant effect of income on housing, military expenditures and other 
expenditures.  These elasticities confirm that Wagner's law is especially applicable for 
cultural and welfare services: education, health and social security spending (Sturm, 1998 
and  Baqir, 2002). Education, health and public services are the less price elastic, which is 
consistent also with Baumol's conjecture, since wage and salary predominant in less price-
elastic functions. Public services, defence and transport and communications are 
corroborated as the most pure public goods and services, a result already found by 
Murdoch and Sandler, (1985) and Randolph et al., ( 1996). These results are also 
compatible, from a supply economic view, with the production of public services, defence 





of economies of scale.  Ageing increases the demand for social spending, health and social 
security, and reduces the share of public services, housing and other expenditures. These 
outcomes are also compatible with interest group theory as elderly people receive more 
benefits from social security and health as other age groups of population (Lindert, 
1996). Moreover, we have found a negative elasticity of the share of the population over 
64 years on education as Poterba (1997), but not at a significant level. It may be also 
inferred that production of health services has economies of scale (Luski and Weinblatt, 
1998).  The share of the young population increases the participation of education and 
health while reducing defence.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper explores how fiscal consolidation can affect the  composition of 
government expenditures. Fiscal discipline will require cuts in government spending 
leading to trade-offs between different functions and affecting government expenditure 
composition. For this purpose we have used a standard median voter model in which 
government can affect the size of public sector perceived by the median voter. Thus, 
government face in the need of budgetary cuts will decrease the less visible 
expenditures, i.e. those long-term projects or those having long-term profitability. We 
have also incorporate demographic factors such as density and age structure of the 
population along with income and tax-price, for capturing state variables affecting the 
utility of the median voter.  
 
  We analyze the determinants of government expenditure composition in a dynamic 





expenditures are government commitments and most of the public employees and physical 
stock are also fixed. The preferred estimator is the GMM suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) which takes into account unobserved country specific effects and possible 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Results show that future cuts in OECD 
government expenditure may fall on defence and other expenditures if it follows the same 
pattern as in the period 1970-1997. On the other hand education shows a negative and 
significant relationship, suggesting that react less than one-to-one to changes in 
government spending. That is education is typically more stable than spending on other 
functions. Housing also show a negative relationship with the public sector size. This 
outcome may be suggesting that OECD countries have reduced their needs for further 
budgetary cuts, decreasing above all the share devoted to defence and subsequently to 
interest payments. We do not find evidence of investment, at least those related to transport 
and communications, being the least visible expenditure. About the rest of determinants 
and though income has been identified as the dominant force, preferences, institutional 
factors, public sector size, density and age structure of the population are also determinants 
driven the composition of government expenditures. This is an important result since the 
inclusion of these variables modifies the composition of government expenditures than 
would be in the absence of these demographic, institutional and fiscal factors.  
 
  Recent models of Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller et al. (1999) underline the 
influence of the structure of government expenditure by functions on economic growth. 
Thus, fiscal consolidation can enhance growth if the share of defence is greater than its 
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Breusch-Pagan Test (chi28) 1079,069 p-value:0,0000 
 